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ABSTRACT 
 
This research focuses on the anti-Sandinista forces popularly known as the 
"contras" who operated in Nicaragua from 1980 to 1990, in particular the 
Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense (FDN), the Alianza Revolucionaria 
Democrática (ARDE), and the two main Atlantic Coast contra groups: MISURA 
(Miskito Sumu and Rama Indians of the Atlantic Coast) and MISURASATA 
(Miskito, Sumu, Rama, Sandinista Aslatakanta [Working Together]).  This 
thesis looks at the different ways these contra groups viewed their conflict and 
explained it to national and international audiences, as well as to those within 
the anti-Sandinista movement. Because there was such heterogeneity within 
the contra movement, a comparative look at the different groups that 
composed it is essential. While there were similar strains of thought among the 
most prominent contra groups, goals were articulated differently from one 
group to another, and these varied narratives serve as a basis to explain how 
they became obstacles to unity among the contra groups, and how these 
differences were finally reconciled into the larger, more-unified anti-Sandinista 
effort. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
   
The 1980s was a decade of political and economic tumult throughout Latin 
America. Nicaragua was no exception as a decades-long revolutionary struggle gave way 
to a protracted guerrilla war that lasted from 1980 and 1990. Roughly 30,000 people on 
both sides of the conflict, including civilians caught in the middle, died in the fighting 
between the government of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN, or 
Sandinistas) and the anti-Sandinista resistance, popularly referred to as the contras.
1
 
While the Sandinistas operated under a unified ideology while heading the Nicaraguan 
state, and could thus be more readily understood to an international audience, a 
comprehensive understanding of the contras proved elusive.  
Confusion surrounding the contra forces can be attributed to both an internal 
incoherence stemming from the oftentimes conflicting motivations between the various 
groups that composed the contras as well as external efforts to discredit them. The 
tenuous nature of a diverse contra coalition made crafting a unified political and social 
message virtually impossible for most of the contras’ existence. The singular “contra” 
label sought to unite peasant comandos under the leadership of small landowners and 
former Guardia Nacional (National Guard) from the Somoza dictatorship in the northern 
highlands, indigenous people on the Atlantic Coast, and disillusioned Sandinistas in the 
                                                 
1
 While an exact death toll is not available, 30,000 represents a conservative estimate, 
with some figures reaching upwards of 40,000. See Holly Sklar, Washington’s War on 
Nicaragua (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1988), 393; Ellie Klerlein, 
“Environmental Effects of Nicaraguan Armed Conflicts,” accessed July 19, 2016, 
http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/nicaragua.htm.  
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South. While this clearly shows that dissatisfaction with the Sandinistas came from many 
circles, the sought-after alliance also allowed the Sandinistas to discredit any forces that 
attacked the state by connecting them to the ex-Guardia that held leadership positions 
within certain contra groups. Only in the last few years of the Contra War did any 
semblance of a broad and unified contra coalition begin to develop. Years of each 
individual contra group defining its own struggle in relative isolation led to a factionalism 
that was not overcome until 1987, when the remaining contra groups united under the 
auspices of the Resistencia Nicaragüense, Nicaraguan Resistance or RN. My research 
focuses on the factors that kept the contras apart prior to 1987, along with the forces that 
ultimately brought many of them together. Detailed attention to documents and first-hand 
accounts outlining how the various contra groups articulated their goals, I argue, is where 
a more nuanced understanding of the Contra War can begin.  
Sources and Methodology  
 My research makes use of primary sources that, as far as I can tell, have been 
heretofore unused in research, including contra missives, communiqués, official 
proclamations, and brainstorming sessions as well as interviews conducted with the 
principal players. I look at the different ways the main contra groups viewed their conflict 
and explained it to national and international audiences, as well as to those within the 
anti-Sandinista movement. The making of the contras is a story of an effort to build 
community and overcome differences in opposition to a central government with more 
troops, resources, and international acceptance. Because there was such heterogeneity 
within the contra movement, a comparative look at the different groups that composed it 
is essential.  
3 
 
What the contras in all their various forms attempted to do was construct a 
narrative to counter that of the Sandinistas. That the contras were a diverse 
conglomeration of interests and groups is undeniable, and while there were similar strains 
of thought among the most prominent groups, no single narrative tells the whole story. 
Goals were articulated differently from one group to another and even these purported 
goals tended to differ depending on who the intended audience was. The Miskito people 
who fought against the Sandinistas on the Atlantic Coast tell a far different story than the 
former Guardsmen along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border, or the ex-Sandinistas in the 
Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática (ARDE) in the south. By looking at these groups 
through a comparative lens, my research diverges from studies that would simplify the 
anti-Sandinista struggle by ascribing the narrative of any one contra group to the entirety 
of the movement.
2
 In this study, I will look at the varied narratives being told both to 
explain how they became obstacles to unity among the contra groups, and how these 
differences were finally reconciled into the larger anti-Sandinista effort to build a 
globally-recognized alternative to the regime in Managua. As it turned out, these efforts 
came too late for the contras, as U.S. funding waned in these years, and a favorable 
                                                 
2
 The following authors are a few of many who tend to simplify the contra effort, mainly 
by attributing the actions and attitudes of the Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense to the 
entirety of the contra movement: Edgar Chamorro, “Confessions of a ‘Contra’,” in 
Nicaragua and the United States, ed. Andrew C. Kimmens (New York: H. W. Wilson 
Company, 1987); Leslie Cockburn, Out of Control: The Story of the Reagan 
Administration’s War in Nicaragua, the Illegal Arms Pipeline, and the Contra Drug 
Connection (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1987); Christopher Dickey, With the 
Contras: A Reporter in the Wilds of Nicaragua (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985); 
Sam Dillon, Comandos: The CIA and Nicaragua’s Contra Rebels (New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 1991); and David Stoll, “The Nicaraguan Contras: Were They 
Indios?” Latin American Politics & Society 47, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 145–157. 
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election in Nicaragua challenged the continuation of an armed military organization 
opposed to the Sandinistas. 
The singular “contra” label belies the variety of ideology and motive within the 
movement, a complexity revealed through a comparative analysis. The term “contra” 
does not take into account the diversity within the anti-Sandinista forces that operated in 
Nicaragua between 1979 and 1990. The term homogenizes a variety of groups, interests, 
and even ethnicities into a single entity that does not accurately reflect the reality of the 
“counterrevolution.” The three principal groups I will examine are the Fuerza 
Democrática Nicaragüense (FDN), the Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática (ARDE), 
and the two main Atlantic Coast contra groups: MISURA (Miskito Sumu and Rama 
Indians of the Atlantic Coast) and MISURASATA (Miskito, Sumu, Rama, Sandinista 
Aslatakanta [Working Together]). The FDN operated in the mountainous northern region 
of the country and was composed of the region’s peasant and middle classes with a small 
cadre of Somoza’s former National Guardsmen comprising the principal leadership. The 
ARDE functioned mainly in the southern part of the country along the border with Costa 
Rica and was composed largely of ex-Sandinistas, the most famous being Edén Pastora. 
MISURA and MISURASATA were principally made up of Miskito Indians along with 
Sumu, Rama, and creoles who populated the Atlantic Coast. The acronym “RN” will be 
used when referring to the Nicaraguan Resistance: the civilian political leadership that, in 
theory, spoke for all anti-Sandinista forces and mainly operated in the United States as a 
liaison between contra military forces and the U.S. government from 1987 until the end 
of the war. I will use the term contra for any blanket statements made about anti-
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Sandinista forces, and I will also use the term comando when referring to individual 
contra fighters in absence of any official rank. 
Bibliographic Review  
 Skepticism abounds about both contra and Sandinista motives and actions during 
the war. Yet in the decades since the initial glut of literature that came out during the war 
and in its immediate aftermath, there has been a paucity of research on the Nicaraguan 
Civil War.
3
 This does not do the topic any justice as untested assumptions are not 
questioned and slowly become accepted as fact. It is worth looking at the Contra War in 
more detail to come to a better understanding of the motives of those involved and to 
prevent this era in Nicaraguan history from becoming a neglected footnote in a larger 
Cold War narrative. 
 Despite the relative lack of attention the Contra War has been paid recently, a few 
American scholars have taken another look at Nicaraguan history and the Contra War in 
the past decade or so, and have added new perspective. Timothy Brown is a historian and 
former State Department diplomat with experience in Nicaragua who has written and 
edited a number of books looking at the Nicaraguan Civil War and its causes from an 
ethnic perspective.
4
 This perspective, while interesting, can be problematic. In his 
argument, he claims that there have been ethnic tensions between the people of the 
                                                 
3
 Historian Lynn Horton also laments the “relative dearth” of literature looking at the 
Contra War from a perspective that departs from the traditional focus on the major 
powers involved. Horton, review of The Real Contra War: Highlander Peasant 
Resistance in Nicaragua, by Timothy C. Brown, Hispanic American Historical Review 
84, no. 1 (February 2004): 163–165, esp. 163. 
4
 Timothy C. Brown, The Real Contra War: Highlander Peasant Resistance in 
Nicaragua (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001); and Brown, ed. and trans., 
When the AK-47s Fall Silent: Revolutionaries, Guerrillas, and the Dangers of Peace 
(Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2000).  
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northern highlands (those who made up the majority of the fighting ranks of the FDN in 
the north of the country) and the Pacific lowlands (the mestizos of the major cities, and 
the principal supporters of the Sandinistas) since pre-Colombian times. He mainly uses 
interviews conducted with former FDN comandos to build the case for an identity of 
opposition that is somewhere between a native Indian identity and a sort of libertarian 
peasant ideology. He sees the rejection of the imposition of an “alien ideological/cultural 
model”—itself a product of the Sandinista’s own “Pacific coast urban ethnocentrism”—
as the root issue of the Contra War.
5
 According to Brown, the war for those who fought 
the Sandinistas was just “one more in a thousand-year-old string of attempts at 
subjugation by outsiders.”6  
 Some historians have either criticized Brown for his methodology or have 
produced work that undercuts Brown’s assertions about contra ethnicity. Brown describes 
various towns and sites in the Matagalpa department that were strongly pro-contra, and 
draws parallels between the anti-Sandinista sentiment there and the rebellious indigenous 
past of the same region that historian Jeffrey Gould covers in his research. In his work on 
Nicaraguan ethnicity, Gould argues that many of the cultural links the people of the 
Nicaraguan highlands had with their indigenous forebears were steadily eroded over the 
course of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries through the process of mestizaje, or mixing: “Ladino 
discourse exhibited a remarkable, totalizing capacity as it parried, then assimilated, every 
indigenous effort at autonomous expression.”7 Gould does not deny the indigenous 
heritage of the departments of Matagalpa, Chontales, and Jinotega, all located within the 
                                                 
5
 Brown, The Real Contra War, 87, 194. 
6
 Ibid., 10. 
7
 Jeffrey L. Gould, To Die In This Way: Nicaraguan Indians and the Myth of Mestizaje, 
1880–1965 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 58. 
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sphere of contra—specifically FDN—influence. However, he differs from Brown in his 
perception that there was still a palpable indigenous identity after over a century of the 
Nicaraguan state actively attempting to eliminate this very identity in the western half of 
the country. Taking into account Gould’s work, Brown’s ethnic contention becomes 
questionable. 
Lynn Horton is another author who takes issue with Brown’s methodology, yet 
focuses her research in much the same way. Like Brown, her research on Nicaragua also 
has a “bottom-up” quality that eschews “policy decisions at the top levels of government 
both in Nicaragua and the United States,” in favor of “the voice of peasants from the rural 
communities where the war was fought,” which she feels “has been largely absent” from 
the literature on the Nicaraguan revolution and the subsequent civil war.
8
 Instead of 
reductively equating U.S. policy and contra motivations, she attempts to understand the 
differences between the two. This is a legitimate concern as there is still history being 
written about the Contra War from a U.S. policy perspective that ignores the perspectives 
of those fighting the war.
9
 Both Brown and Horton find a population that views itself as 
separate from the majority population of the Pacific lowlands, but instead of focusing on 
ethnic tensions as the root cause of contra/Sandinista animosity as Brown does, Horton 
looks at highland peasant culture and its institutions for clues to the genesis of the contra 
struggle. For instance, part of the problem the Sandinistas created for themselves in the 
                                                 
8
 Lynn Horton, Peasants in Arms: War and Peace in the Mountains of Nicaragua, 1979–
1994 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1998), 311. She also echoes this same 
sentiment in Horton, review of The Real Contra War, 163. 
9
 See Duane R. Clarridge and Digby Diehl, A Spy For All Seasons: My Life in the CIA 
(New York: Scribner, 1997); Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the 
United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 
2006); and Michael Holm, “Brothers In Arms: Congress, the Reagan Administration and 
Contra Aid, 1981–1986” (master’s thesis, McGill University, 2007). 
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northern highlands, Horton argues, stemmed from a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
patterns of rural hierarchy.
10
 On the other hand, the northern contras—by both operating 
in close proximity to and being composed of people from this region—were able to take 
advantage of specific economic and cultural systems like the finquero sector and patron-
client ties in ways that the Sandinistas did not. Much in the same vein, Robert Langlois 
adds that the Sandinistas “disrupted the deep-rooted patterns of peasant community and 
kinship” by fostering distrust between neighbors and among communities, and that 
“kinship was a natural channel for joining the contras.”11 Both of these perspectives go 
beyond simply blaming the Sandinistas for misguided policies and instead look at the 
people who were most affected by these policies, asking why they took up arms. In this 
case, these authors demonstrate, it was not because U.S. policy told them to. 
All of the aforementioned studies have looked almost exclusively at the northern 
highlands, and for good reason: this is where the majority of the contras came from and 
where they most-successfully operated. But the Atlantic Coast complicates the story of 
the contras due to the stark differences between its demographics and that of the rest of 
the country. The work of Charles Hale and his study of Miskito ethnicity is indispensable 
in looking at the Atlantic Coast contras.
12
 He does not deal with the Contra War 
specifically, but his ideas concerning Miskito ethnic identity such as the importance of 
“Anglo affinity” are important to my research in that they go some way toward 
                                                 
10
 Lynn R. Horton, “Constructing Conservative Identity: Peasant Mobilization Against 
Revolution In Nicaragua,” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 9 No. 2 (June 2004): 
167–280. 
11
 Robert Langlois, “Becoming a Contra: The Dilemma of Peasants during the Revolution 
in Nicaragua,” International Journal, vol. 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1997): 701–02. 
12
 Charles R. Hale, Resistance and Contradiction: Miskitu Indians and the Nicaraguan 
State, 1894–1987 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994). 
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explaining the anti-Sandinista sentiments that led the Miskitos and other Atlantic Coast 
indigenous peoples to be such an integral part of the contra movement.
13
 Hale’s work 
highlights the key differences between the Atlantic Coast peoples and the rest of the 
country which maintained the “Mestizo standard of cultural homogeneity” that Gould 
discussed in his work.
14
 This struggle between conformity and diverse group expression 
is one that plays itself out throughout the conflict and explains the successes and failures 
of both the Sandinistas and the contras in fully assimilating the Atlantic Coast indigenous 
peoples into their cause. 
Sandinista sympathizers have also tried in some ways to understand the 
Sandinista failure to garner more support on the Atlantic Coast. The contributions of the 
likes of Carlos Vilas, an Argentina-born political economist who worked for the 
Sandinista Ministry of Planning on the Atlantic Coast, help explain the Atlantic Coast 
contras from the Sandinista perspective.
15
 He, like Horton and Langlois, is somewhat 
critical of the inability of the FSLN to understand the culture of the Atlantic Coast, but he 
is equally disdainful of two of the biggest influences on life in the Atlantic Coast: the 
Moravian church, and the U.S. government. While his analysis is from the perspective of 
a former Sandinista official, his discussion of Miskito history and collective memory is 
valuable in understanding their Miskito motivations during the Contra War. 
The final significant group to constitute the contra forces was the ARDE, which 
Donald Castillo Rivas details in his book Gringos, contras y sandinistas. Although he 
                                                 
13
 Ibid., 28, 58. 
14
 Ibid., 36; John Beverley, Subalterneity and Representation: Arguments in Cultural 
Theory (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), 95. 
15
Carlos M. Vilas, State, Class, and Ethnicity in Nicaragua: Capitalist Modernization 
and Revolutionary Change on the Atlantic Coast, trans. Susan Norwood (Boulder, CO: L. 
Rienner Publishers, 1989). 
10 
 
was involved with the ARDE and subsequently the RN, he does not hold back criticism 
of either the ARDE or the contra movement as a whole. He hangs the ARDE’s failures 
mainly on Edén Pastora’s poor leadership and laments the inability of the contras to 
explain their struggle to audiences outside the movement. He also attempts to place the 
contra struggle within the larger context of Nicaraguan political history and the political 
“deficiencies” a half-century of Somoza rule produced.16 
As mentioned before, there are a number of works focusing on the conflict mainly 
from a U.S. foreign policy perspective or from the Sandinista perspective.
17
 These works 
tend to be characterized by their appearance either during the conflict or in its immediate 
aftermath, and can have a palpably emotional or biased tone. However, some are quite 
useful in introducing the reader to important historical actors and setting the stage for the 
events of the war. Journalist Glenn Garvin and authors Roger Miranda and William 
Ratliff offer up a pair of informative overviews of the conflict, but they both fail to go 
into the contra movements in depth, either focusing on the U.S. perspective (Garvin) or 
the Sandinista view (Miranda and Ratliff).
18
 This is somewhat understandable as these 
                                                 
16
 Donald Castillo Rivas, Gringos, contras y sandinistas: Testimonio de la Guerra civil 
en Nicaragua (Bogotá: TM Editores, 1993), 235. 
17
 This sort of literature includes but is not limited to: Edgar Chamorro, Packaging the 
Contras: A Case of CIA Disinformation (New York: Institute for Media Analysis, 1987); 
Clarridge, A Spy For All Seasons; Cockburn, Out of Control; Dickey, With the Contras; 
Dillon, Comandos; Grandin, Empire’s Workshop; Karl Grossman, Nicaragua: America’s 
New Vietnam? (Sag Harbor, NY: Permanent Press, 1984); Holm, “Brothers In Arms”; 
Andrew C. Kimmens, ed., Nicaragua and the United States (New York: H. W. Wilson 
Company, 1987); Henry A. Kissinger, Report on the National Bipartisan Commission on 
Central America (1984; repr., Darby, PA: DIANE Publishing 1998); Robert S. Leiken 
and Barry Rubin, eds., The Central American Crisis Reader (New York: Summit Books, 
1987); and Thomas W. Walker, ed., Reagan versus the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War 
on Nicaragua (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987). 
18
 Glenn Garvin, Everybody Had His Own Gringo: The CIA and the Contras 
(Washington: Brassey’s [US], Inc., 1992); and Roger Miranda and William Ratliff, The 
11 
 
books are sweeping in nature and try to put the entire conflict in a comprehensible 
narrative. In addition, they both came out in the first years after the conflict and lack 
some of the perspective of more recent research. But they do have value. A pair of 
interesting works that look at the war from a first-hand perspective are Duane “Dewey” 
Clarridge’s A Spy For All Seasons and Edgar Chamorro’s Packaging the Contras. 
Clarridge is an ex-CIA officer who helped acquire funding for the contras, and writes of 
the contras in a positive—if almost paternalistic and grandiose—tone as he describes the 
conflict years after retiring. He offers important insights into the machinations of funding 
the contra effort and how various agencies in Washington perceived them. Chamorro, on 
the other hand, writes as the embittered former head of public relations for the RN. He 
too has unique insights to offer, but these two sources have noted, if understandable, 
biases.  
Thesis and Research Questions 
This paper will look at how the motivations and interests of the FDN, 
MISURA/MISURASATA, and the ARDE kept the contras from forming a unified front 
against the Sandinistas for much of their existence, and the factors that ultimately created 
conditions more conducive to unity. The FDN drew its strength from the masses of 
disaffected people in Nicaragua’s northern highlands who saw their own values reflected 
in the FDN’s objectives, even though former Guardsmen from other areas of the country 
occupied most of its highest leadership roles. In their messaging, the FDN laid out a 
mission based on the restoration of personal liberties that fit snugly into the northern 
highland’s tradition of relative independence and “difference” from the traditional seat of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Civil War in Nicaragua: Inside the Sandinistas (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 1993). 
12 
 
political power in the Pacific lowlands.
19
 These goals would also find their expression in 
the contra movement more broadly, but they first formed from a narrower, regional 
mindset that happened to also meet the desire of Washington to bankroll a “democratic” 
military force that would help roll back communism in Latin America. 
On the Atlantic Coast, MISURA and MISURASATA also found motivation in 
regional traditions of independence and opposition to the interference of the state in daily 
life. The main difference was that the indigenous makeup of its comandos gave the 
Atlantic Coast contra groups ethnic and cultural dimensions the FDN and the ARDE did 
not share and often did not understand. The Contra War on the Atlantic Coast was much 
more regionally focused, and incorporated themes of religious, cultural, and historical 
differences, which put it in opposition to both Managua and the overall goals of the 
contra movement.  
Finally, the former Sandinistas who made up much of the ARDE’s ranks saw their 
war as a continuation of the Sandinista Revolution. They were sympathetic to the initial 
goals of the revolution, but were disillusioned by the changes they began to see in the 
regime, whether it was the increasingly oppressive state security apparatus or their 
progressively marginalized roles outside Managua’s influential circles. Unlike the other 
groups, it is nearly impossible to separate the ARDE from its charismatic leader, Edén 
Pastora, and his mercurial ideology. Personal politics, infighting, and an unwillingness to 
compromise hobbled both the ARDE’s efforts and any real chance of contra unity across 
disaffected sectors of Nicaraguan society. 
                                                 
19
 Horton, “Constructing Conservative Identity,” 167–280; 168. 
13 
 
Each group brought unique preoccupations to their struggle which was further 
complicated by U.S. involvement. With millions of dollars of funds and materiel on the 
line and with U.S. government involvement at all levels of contra activity, extricating 
U.S. interests from the contra effort verges on impossible. However, comparing how the 
Reagan administration thought of the contras and how the contras viewed themselves can 
be a valuable exercise in uncovering independent strains of contra thought. It is here 
where individual fighters’ testimonies are essential in uncovering the divergent goals and 
motivations that were true obstacles to contra unity. 
Teasing out these differences in a comparative framework helps explain the 
successes and failures of unifying into a viable military and political alternative to the 
Sandinistas. The myth of contra unity begins to break down when the differing messages 
and motivations within what is supposed to be a unified front are laid out, exposing the 
deep divisions and differences in priorities that lurked below the surface. While the 
contra groups shared the goal of seeing the Sandinistas removed from power, at times 
even invoking the same sort of images, exploring their differences helps us understand 
why unification was such a difficult process. We can also better understand what it took 
to overcome these differences and bring about a more unified resistance. Studying how 
these various groups attempted to assert their individuality as they jockeyed for power 
and sought to have their voices heard amid a confusing and enervating war serves to 
explain both the mire in which the contras found themselves for nearly a decade, and the 
steps that ultimately led toward greater unification. 
To see how each of these groups envisioned their place within the broader contra 
movement, I look at contra press releases; self-published magazines, newsletters, and 
14 
 
manuals; personal correspondence; interviews and autobiographies of comandos; notes 
from contra planning sessions; correspondence with foreign officials; and news releases 
about the contras. These sources allow distinctive contra narratives to shine through. This 
is not to say that these narratives are not tainted by outside forces or that these messages 
do not have their own biases, but it goes further in documenting the differences within the 
contra movement and correcting the view of an undifferentiated and unthinking mass of 
anti-Sandinistas waging a brutal war against a revolutionary regime. To this end, this 
study looks at the process of community building across the diverse sectors of 
Nicaraguan society that took a stand against the Sandinistas, and the myriad ways in 
which they attempted to position themselves as an all-encompassing, Nicaraguan 
alternative to Sandinismo. 
  
15 
 
FDN 
 
 
   
The Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense (FDN) was by far the largest and most 
militarily-successful contra group to operate in Nicaragua, with roughly 15,000 troops at 
the height of the war. This success proved a double-edged sword, as their battlefield 
victories were due in no small part to a discipline instilled by a leadership and fighting 
force that contained a small but visible contingent of Anastasio Somoza’s maligned 
National Guardsmen, and to U.S. military and financial support. As Lynn Horton 
explains, at the same time that the FDN was fighting Sandinistas in Nicaragua’s northern 
highlands, “they were also engaged in an intense discursive struggle over the causes and 
significance of the war” in the court of national and international public opinion.20 The 
FDN continue to color how the entire Contra War is viewed, which masks the diversity of 
interests and goals among contra fighters. Nonetheless, their motivations do serve as a 
baseline for understanding the contras more broadly. 
Given their military primacy and roots in the earliest anti-Sandinista groups, the 
FDN became the prism through which many observers outside of Nicaragua understood 
the contras. But the local motivations of individual fighters and leaders also reveal a more 
nuanced and heterogeneous force whose interests did not always align with those of other 
contra groups. The idea of a struggle for a “democratic Nicaragua” is a recurring theme 
both in FDN and U.S. government documents, but it was likely not these lofty, abstract 
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ideas that swelled the FDN’s ranks to the tens of thousands.21 Instead, individual and 
deeply personal goals seem to have been driving forces behind the FDN, rooted in the 
desire to reinstate personal liberties that many individual comandos felt were lost when 
the Sandinistas took power.  
The FDN officially began in 1982, but several smaller insurgent groups that 
formed the basis of what would become the FDN had been operating in the northern 
highlands of Nicaragua since the moment the Sandinistas took power in 1979.
22
 A 
recruiter for one of these early groups, Legión 15 de Septiembre, recalled, “We had no 
ideology of our own. The basic idea was that we were living in a time of war, and that we 
needed to use the means of war to force the present government to its knees. Afterwards 
we would be able to elect a liberal/conservative government.”23 With such nebulous early 
goals, it is no wonder that contra groups did not initially attract fighters in large numbers. 
In fact, this lack of a clearly articulated ideology plagued the FDN throughout the Contra 
War. Consequently, FDN ranks only truly began to grow when spurred by the 
introduction of Sandinista social programs to rural areas, especially with comprehensive 
agrarian reform in 1980.  
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Indeed, the lack—and in some cases the outright rejection—of an explicit 
ideology is clearly evident in many comandos’ personal accounts. In his introduction to a 
collection of interviews of former contras, former Sandinista diplomat Alejandro 
Bendaña explained, “A key sector of the campesino community entered into conflict with 
Sandinismo out of immediate and particular reasons or motivations, more so than 
ideological factors.”24 One such interviewee admitted to never having voted and was 
ambivalent about who sat in the presidential palace. Yet another stated, “For most of us, 
we went to the Contra because of the repression, not because of ideology.”25 
“Repression” as it was understood by comandos tended to be highly personal and took on 
the form of religious persecution, land confiscation, or forced conscription into the 
Sandinista Liberation Army.
26
  
In an expansive press release announcing its formation in 1982, the FDN laid out 
a list of demands that included the reinstallation of democratic government (calling 
specifically for elections), freedom of religion and expression, press freedom, the right to 
private property, and the right to organize freely—broadly understood in terms of labor 
and political organization.
27
 While these general calls for political freedom and social 
justice were palatable to U.S. government entities involved in contra affairs, all of these 
tenets found their initial expression in the personal experiences of individual comandos, 
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some of whom had initially fought in contra groups that predated the FDN. In particular, 
the perceived assault on religious freedom and the Sandinista appropriation of private 
properties proved to be two of the most potent factors motivating FDN comandos to join 
the anti-Sandinista cause. 
 Post-revolutionary Nicaragua was still a Catholic-majority country with a nascent 
but growing evangelical protestant minority. In this religious milieu, respect for religious 
freedom was one of the most-cited liberties motivating the FDN. It was difficult for the 
Sandinistas to keep reports of religious intolerance out of opposition newspapers and U.S. 
government publications. Sandinista supporters invading Protestant churches, state 
attempts to discredit opposition clergy, or state-sponsored turbas divinas (“divine mobs”) 
interrupting Pope John Paul II while he was conducting mass in Managua in 1983 gave 
anti-Sandinistas more than enough ammunition to label the FSNL as antagonistic to 
religious institutions.
28
 The audience for such literature may have, as the former 
Sandinista representative to the United Nations charged, been actively created by contra 
leadership and the Reagan Administration in an attempt to manipulate “religious 
sentiment” to its advantage against the Sandinistas. 29 Indeed, the Reagan Administration 
reported on Sandinista anti-religious activity both officially and in off-the-record 
communication. An example of the latter comes in remarks like those found in a letter to 
Senator Richard Lugar in which Deputy Secretary of State John C. Whitehead 
legitimized support of the FDN by stating that “the actual fighters of the Resistance are 
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overwhelmingly rural youths loyal to their families and localities driven to rebellion by 
Sandinista attacks on religion and independent farming.”30 Here, religious persecution 
and the threat to small-scale capitalism are expressed as concerns of equal import. These 
themes were playing out globally as the Cold War was entering its final decade, and 
Nicaragua was no exception. 
 But independent of religious oppression being used abroad as a way to make the 
contras more sympathetic, the FDN itself was particularly adamant about the religious 
nature of its movement. This was a feeling that both arose out of the FDN’s ranks and 
was actively constructed by the FDN and its leadership both for internal morale and for 
propaganda purposes. For example, at a planning seminar in Miami aiming to bring the 
contra movement under one group, representatives of the Unidad Nicaragüense 
Opositora, or UNO, brainstormed about how to build credibility, and about the factors 
that motivated campesinos to fight. Freedom of religion was mentioned alongside 
“integrity and unity of the family,” and the right to private property.31 There was a 
perceived assault on the markers of Nicaraguan identity, the Christian faith being one of 
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several institutions perceived as increasingly endangered by the Sandinistas. In one 
document outlining its strategic public relations stance against the FSLN, UNO placed 
persecution of organized religion as one of the four “big themes,” along with human 
rights violations, union repression, and indigenous issues.
32
 Again, this document was 
also tied to strategies combating negative press reports about contra forces. 
But these were not complaints the contra leadership simply generated in planning 
meetings. The religious feeling of many of the comandos is readily on display outside of 
official documents. One comando related, “I heard a Sandinista say he didn’t believe in 
God, but we carried out a job and defeated them with the help of God because we walked 
with the Bible they gave us in the Resistance.”33 So prevalent was scripture in the FDN 
that the Lord’s Prayer was included in the Centro de Instrucción Militar (CIM, the FDN’s 
military basic training center) instruction manual for prospective FDN comandantes.
34
 
Even in an institutional, military publication, religion was something that, while not 
immediately relevant to officer training, colored the day-to-day business of the FDN. 
According to numerous FDN documents, comandos were supposed to represent 
“the democratic and Christian guerrilla” who believes in “God, family and work” and 
who fights “heroically in defense of the Christian faith, the values and morals and the 
most sacred principles of Democracy.”35 The FDN promoted this image in publications 
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both for internal and external consumption. A common refrain in FDN documents was 
con Dios y patriotismo derrotaremos al comunismo, with God and patriotism we will 
defeat communism.
36
 The connection between what it meant to be Nicaraguan was 
closely linked with religious belief. This image was prominent in the glossy Comandos 
newsletter published by the FDN public relations office. The publication served an 
important dual purpose: to boost morale among the troops and to improve the image of 
the contras abroad. Even FDN public relations chief Edgar Chamorro noted that it was 
often the intent of the magazine to exploit the image of the “Christian soldier.”37 The 
fourth issue featured on its cover “Christian guerrillas,” with a photo of one comando 
wearing a rosary while others knelt in the background, reading what appear to be 
Bibles.
38
 The December 1983 issue used highly charged religious language in an attempt 
to motivate comandos: “when one participates in the Crusade to rescue the homeland, for 
religious freedom, for the rights of man, and for peace and democracy, then, more than 
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ever, is one close to God.”39 Chamorro himself was a former Jesuit and had a large role in 
constructing these early publications before leaving the FDN leadership in 1984, so the 
adept use of religious language is unsurprising.  
For the FDN, these values were diametrically opposed to the Sandinista regime 
and its ideology. In its Code of Conduct, the FDN claimed, “Every member of the FDN is 
very clear that we fight in a Civil War that has been imposed on us Nicaraguans by a 
Marxist-Leninist system that enslaves the individual, denies God and imposes war, 
tyranny, state monopoly, [and] the elimination of social classes.”40 The FDN comandos 
thus fought “to return to our country its moral, spiritual, western, and Christian values,” 
which for some equated to the Contra War being a “sacred war.”41 
Despite the presence of Catholic imagery and the leadership of Chamorro, the 
magazine usually took a non-denominational tact when discussing Christianity. After all, 
the challenge of building community across a religiously plural national populace would 
have only been made more difficult by the introduction or acknowledgement of sectarian 
differences by an official contra publication. If the goals of the magazine were to boost 
comando morale and lure possible recruits, a broad use of religion seems to have been an 
effective way to do so given the frequency and intentionality with which it was used. If 
the young men and women who fought for the FDN came from strong religious 
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backgrounds, it stood to reason that the FDN could benefit from reflecting their beliefs 
institutionally, and tapping into the feelings of pride, fear, and paranoia that came along 
with them. 
 The attempt to promote both the idea of the Christian soldier and religious 
diversity within the FDN is on display in a document called Portraits of the Contras 
written by exiled businessman Jaime Morales Carazo (under the pseudonym “Tolentino 
Cifar”). One FDN comandante, “Fernando,” was prominently featured because of his past 
as an evangelical Protestant pastor.
42
 The purpose of the document was to highlight 
certain combatants who were to represent the best the FDN had to offer, and the fact that 
Comandante Fernando “aspired to serve God and his people” first as a pastor and then as 
a comando allowed the FDN to advance an image it was ever-eager to capitalize on.
43
 By 
highlighting the presence of religious minorities in positions of authority within the 
context of a Catholic-majority country, FDN leadership hoped to lure U.S. evangelical 
backing by showing off the FDN’s respect for diversity while also attracting Nicaraguan 
recruits by showcasing the FDN’s religious tolerance in opposition to the perceived 
intolerance of the FSLN.
44
 
 The other major strain of anti-Sandinista thought within the FDN involved the 
appropriation of private properties for use in FSLN agricultural collectivization 
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projects.
45
 For Managua, the “primitive and individualist” way in which northern 
highlands campesinos and landowners tilled their land was an “obstacle” to the goal of 
collective organization.
46
 But just as the FSLN misjudged its disruptive forays into 
indigenous populations on the Atlantic Coast, so too did they misjudge the “deeply 
ingrained conservatism” of both the landed and landless populations in the northern 
highlands.
47
 
 It is not difficult to imagine wealthy landowners flocking to the FDN’s cause. One 
comando from a self-described “well-to-do” family of ranch owners wanted nothing 
more than to “pay the Sandinistas back” for the appropriation of his family’s lands.48 But 
this does not explain the attraction of the FDN for the far larger population of tenant 
farmers in the region. Horton posits that the northern highlands already displayed high 
esteem for “private property, a strong work ethic, patriarchy, honor, and self-sufficiency,” 
and the FDN used these pre-existing feelings to frame Sandinista land reform “not as an 
act of social justice, but rather as the theft of private property, the product of a man’s hard 
labor."
49
 Indeed, state agricultural programs required that even “dispossessed and land-
poor peasants reconstruct their concept of community,” which goes some way to explain 
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why these programs had the unintended consequence of undermining peasant support in 
the countryside.
50
  
Horton writes extensively about the importance of kinship networks to northern 
highland society, and the FDN made use of these networks from landowners on down, to 
foster support for its cause. In writing about the FDN’s advancement into new territories 
in 1986, the Department of State also wrote about the importance of contra supply 
networks “making use of family ties” in order to “retain local backing.”51 To put it 
another way, although Somoza’s Nicaragua had been oppressive and corrupt, at least hard 
work was tempered with the “freedom to pursue independent lives,” within the political 
strictures of the dictatorship.
52
 In her work on development in Latin America, sociologist 
María Josefina Saldaña-Portillo laments that appeals by “elites and 
counterrevolutionaries spoke to the itinerant proletarians’ and the minifundistas’ [small 
landowners’] interest in autonomy, which superseded their interests as workers, 
especially since the FSLN was unable to dramatically improve their status as a 
proletariat.”53 Rather than being a bastion of revolutionary sentiment like the country’s 
urban populations, the campesinos of the northern highlands had a strong conservative or 
even libertarian streak that funneled troops into the FDN and against the government in 
Managua.  
 The most obvious and painful manifestation of the new regime for many in the 
northern highlands was the loss of private property. Taken within the context of the Cold 
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War, the FDN tried to place themselves as defenders of homegrown, small-scale 
capitalism in the face of an imported model of wealth redistribution. The FDN often 
framed their fight in the context of past foreign invasions. For example, the second issue 
of Comandos exhorted Nicaraguans to emulate their forefathers who had expelled 
American filibuster William Walker and his invading force in 1856.
54
 Going even further 
into history, RN head Adolfo Calero put the contra’s struggle in pre-Columbian as well 
as more modern terms: “The Chorotega and Nahua Indians founded Nicaragua, in revolt 
against the tyranny of the Olmecs, as the land of their freedom… During the last century 
our forefathers threw out William Walker… We overthrew a rightist dictatorship and are 
now fighting a leftist totalitarian regime.”55 Both the Olmecs and Walker are posited as 
antecedents for the new foreign ideological invasion linked in contra discourse to the 
Sandinistas.  
After the FDN became a more regularized fighting force by the middle of the 
decade, its leadership began to make a concerted effort to correct this perceived 
ideological deficiency by incorporating its own ideological instruction into its military 
training regime. The FDN published the “Blue and White Book” (corresponding to the 
colors of the Nicaraguan flag) in 1983 so that comandos could “educate themselves about 
what they were fighting for,” in particular “a democratic and pluralistic government in 
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Nicaragua.”56 Additionally, “democratic leaders” were embedded in military units so as 
to explain what it meant to be in a “democratic force” at the fighting level.57 Political 
training also became an element of CIA training for contra commanders as it “enhanced 
their awareness of the political nature of the insurgency,” although this did not happen 
until after the RN formed and the military conflict was de-escalating.
58
 
 There was also pressure for the FDN to tie the Contra War to the civil war raging 
next door in El Salvador. Since the Carter administration, the United States had already 
been thinking of the leftist Salvadoran guerrillas and the FSLN as symptoms of the same 
problem, a line of thinking which solidified under the Reagan White House.
59
 However, 
very little indicates that the FDN saw their war in those terms. An official communique 
from UNO dated May 29, 1986 made an oblique reference to the “common defense of the 
security of the Central American Isthmus,” but top FDN leaders were less concerned 
about the flow of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador than with fighting their own war in 
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their own country.
60
 As Edgar Chamorro stated after he left the FDN directorate, “I did 
not care about El Salvador. I cared about Nicaragua.”61 The relative silence of the FDN 
on the issue of El Salvador suggests that comandos at all ranks of the FDN felt much the 
same way.
62
 Initially, some FDN leaders thought—perhaps naively—that while the 
United States would hold the purse strings, they would have a greater say in the direction 
of their war; as Chamorro would later complain, “I joined [the FDN] on the 
understanding that the United States Government would supply us the means necessary to 
defeat the Sandinistas and replace them as a government, but I believed that we would be 
our own masters.”63  
Former Nicaraguan Permanent Representative to the United Nations Alejandro 
Bendaña charged that the U.S. government failed to incorporate the true interests of the 
rural FDN comandos into its dealings with the FDN and the contras writ large, 
characterizing U.S. contra support as “a plan that never took into account the interests of 
the campesinos, instead only taking into account the anti-Soviet policy of the American 
Administration.”64 State Department cables do show an evolving understanding on the 
part of Washington of the actual men and women who composed the FDN’s ranks as the 
war dragged on, yet while the U.S. government had a notional understanding of these 
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motivations, Washington still saw the conflict through the prism of the Cold War.
65
 And 
indeed, high-minded struggles over the FDN’s discourse and how best to express its 
essential “democratic” and nationalist nature took place mainly among the top leadership 
of the FDN and their Washington interlocutors.
66
 But conversely, as former chief of the 
Sandinista Defense Ministry Secretariat Roger Miranda posited, the FSLN also failed to 
realize “that the Contra War had become a peasant insurrection… a fact most Sandinista 
leaders themselves had great difficulty understanding for years.”67 The comandos doing 
the actual fighting came up with their own ideas and motivations, joining the FDN 
despite any “inconsideration” on the part of Washington or Managua.68 For most of the 
FDN’s comandos, the recovery of personal “liberty and rights” took precedent over any 
other consideration.
69
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Atlantic Coast 
 
 
   
 The indigenous peoples that joined the contra movement on Nicaragua’s Atlantic 
Coast shared many similarities with the contras in the northern highlands—primarily a 
sense of cultural difference from the rest of the country and a feeling of alienation toward 
early Sandinista policies. Indeed some of the earliest anti-Sandinista groups sprang up on 
the Atlantic Coast, and some of the Sandinista’s most visible abuses took place there. If 
there was one region that had the potential to sully the generally favorable view of the 
FSLN abroad, it was the Atlantic Coast. 
 Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast was a diverse region consisting of the Miskito, Sumu, 
and Rama Indians, as well as Afro-descended creoles and Spanish-speaking mestizos.
70
 
The Miskito people were the dominant indigenous group, and much of the Atlantic Coast 
contra leadership drew from this population, although all groups had some representation 
within the contra movement. The Miskito contras will be my primary focus due to their 
greater numbers and the fact that Miskito leaders tended to dominate anti-Sandinista 
thought on the Atlantic Coast, although they often espoused a pan-indigenous worldview 
that both linked the Atlantic Coast contras to international indigenous struggles for 
autonomy, and incorporated the other Atlantic Coast constituent groups into the Contra 
War.  
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Prior to the FSLN’s rise to power, the Somoza-era narrative of the Atlantic Coast 
tended to follow that the people there “generally lived in a condition of neglect.”71 
However, the FSLN soon began to bring nation-building programs to the region which 
chafed with local traditions in some communities. As early as 1980, U.S. government 
national security analysts were already looking to the Atlantic Coast as a potential hotbed 
of discontent within Sandinista Nicaragua.
72
 Complaints about limits on the harvesting 
and sale of natural resources, as well as culturally insensitive literacy campaigns 
eventually snowballed into outright conflict.
73
 At worst, the early Sandinista 
understanding of the Atlantic Coast assumed a “blank page of primitivism” that needed to 
be corrected through social programs already being rolled out in the rest of the country—
a symptom of a "paternalistic and narrowly modernistic attitude toward the peasantry."
74
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As in the northern highlands, the intrusive nature of these programs—
administered by Spanish-speaking mestizos from the more populated areas closer to the 
Pacific—caused some on the Atlantic Coast to look back on the neglect of the Somoza 
years with a nostalgia that was little-understood by Nicaraguans from major cities. In the 
words of one Miskito comando, “For many years before the Sandinistas came to power, 
we were subjected to neglect by the dictatorship of the Somoza family, but that was a 
blessing compared to the brutal malevolence of the Sandinistas.”75 Even Miskito leader 
Brooklyn Rivera, who had been an early champion of the Sandinista revolution and 
remained a moderating force within the Atlantic Coast contra movement, characterized 
Sandinista action on the Atlantic Coast not as a “revolution of social justice, [but] rather a 
process of hatred, destabilization and social repression.”76  
 Despite the heated rhetoric against the FSLN, it was the very Sandinista 
revolution that created the space for discussion about autonomy on the Atlantic Coast. In 
an early article from the Sandinista publication Barricada, indigenous leaders from 
MISURASATA (Miskito, Sumu, Rama, Sandinista Aslatakanta [Working Together]) saw 
the revolution as a positive means to “recover and promote our culture” and “meet our 
economic needs.”77 Much in the same way the revolution made it possible to talk about 
democracy after decades of dictatorship, so too did it spur a renewed interest in 
indigenous autonomy. Rivera recognized the debt the Atlantic Coast Indian activists 
owed to Sandinismo: "Of course the revolution made this whole movement possible. The 
                                                 
75
 Reynaldo Reyes and J. K. Wilson, Ráfaga: The Life Story of a Nicaraguan Miskito 
Comandante, ed. Tod Sloan (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), 4. 
76
 Brooklyn Rivera, Problems of the Indians with the Sandinista Revolution, letter from 
September 1981, in National Revolution and Indigenous Identity, 207. 
77
 MISURASATA, “Together We Will Build a Just Society!” from Barricada, November 
27, 1979, in National Revolution and Indigenous Identity, 40. 
33 
 
fervor of the revolutionary triumph injected into the soul, heart and atmosphere that 
everybody could express themselves and participate. Before there was no incentive ... we 
were just asleep."
78
 Even Steadman Fagoth, the Miskito leader who broke with 
MISURASATA 1983 to form the MISURA (Miskito, Sumu, Rama) contra group, started 
out as a member of the Sandinista Council of State. While Miskito leaders shared the 
ultimate goal of autonomy within Nicaragua, they disagreed fundamentally about the 
ways in which to achieve that goal. Ultimately, the Atlantic Coast population split 
between those who advocated for negotiation with the FSLN and those who chose armed 
conflict.
79
  
 National security concerns and economic development initially informed the 
Sandinistas’ presence on the Atlantic Coast.80 However it did not take long before the 
FSLN’s relationship with the Atlantic Coast population turned adversarial, with the 
government coming to be viewed by significant portions of the population as an 
occupying force.
81
 As Miskito and other Indian leaders demanded more autonomy, the 
government in Managua viewed the Atlantic Coast with greater suspicion, especially as 
nascent contra groups began to operate in the northern highlands along the same border 
with Honduras that stretched to the Atlantic. Instances of isolated violence, usually 
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involving excessive force on the part of Sandinista security forces, coupled with 
increasingly militant calls for autonomy, served to drive many Atlantic Coast Indians to 
the contra cause.
82
 One anthropologist wrote that there eventually came a point where “to 
identify as Miskitu became virtually synonymous with being counterrevolutionary.”83 
The most tragic result of this view was the FSLN’s forced relocation of thousands of 
Indian communities on the Atlantic Coast beginning in December 1981 in an attempt to 
disrupt MISURA and MISURASATA’s bases of support.84 Cultural differences largely 
fed this perception which was not entirely unjustified given that the cultural and historical 
differences of the Atlantic Coast, along with Sandinista abuses, led directly to the 
formation of a significant contra force in the region.  
While the rest of Nicaragua was predominantly Catholic, social and political life 
on the Atlantic Coast has been dominated by the Moravian Church since the first 
missionaries arrived in the mid-1800s. Anthropologist Charles Hale credits the 
Moravians’ success among the Miskitos as providing them another means to carry on 
with their historical defiance of “government rule” stretching back to the Spanish 
conquest. “Converting Miskitu people to Protestantism, educating them in Moravian 
schools, and promoting their own language reinforced their identity and enhanced their 
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sense of being different from ‘Spaniards.’” The Moravian Church proved adept at 
adapting to the cultural needs of the local population: “Miskitu people converted to the 
Moravian religion through a process of reciprocity, the argument goes, whereby 
missionaries respected, even deferred to, a preexisting Miskitu identity.”85 
The Moravian Church also played a significant role in the economic development 
of the region. The church “enthusiastically greeted the arrival of new investments and 
companies, in which it saw the solution to the serious problems of unemployment… and 
low income for the natives.”86 With the arrival of these new companies came new social 
services that added to those already being provided by the church. Since most of these 
companies were North American, this only added to what Hale defines as the Miskitos’ 
“Anglo affinity” that had begun to form since their first contact with Europeans of non-
Spanish origin.
87
 
By the time Sandinista programs arrived, Atlantic Coast Indians already had a 
preferred system of non-profit subsistence and communal land distribution which, instead 
of being a part of any Marxist model, stemmed from, as they saw it, “Biblical teachings 
both of the Old and New Testaments.”88 From the Sandinistas’ point of view, part of the 
reason the Miskitos resisted integration into the nation was that the Moravian Church had 
an interest in keeping the Atlantic Coast from integrating. The church “reinforced the 
aspirations of Costeños for autonomy, adding a spiritual argument to other, more secular 
ones.” This is to say that the “government policy of extending public health and social 
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security programs threatened the church’s near monopoly in this sphere.”89 One Miskito 
Moravian pastor said that Sandinista programs might have actually been well-received “if 
the government had sent Americans, Canadians, Europeans” who were sympathetic to the 
revolution instead of the Nicaraguans and Cubans they did send.
90
  
The Moravian Church in Nicaragua was “fervently anticommunist,” and given 
that the church was the “strongest ideological influence on the Miskitu and Creole 
peoples,” it is not a stretch to presume that anticommunism was simply another marker of 
Atlantic Coast difference from the rest of the country.
91
 One anthropologist wrote that 
“Sandinista distrust of evangelicals was fed by events on the Atlantic Coast.”92 As 
evangelical missions in other parts of Nicaragua received financial aid from overseas, 
especially from the United States, it was not a drastic leap of logic on the part of the 
FSLN to see all forms of evangelical Christianity as potentially threatening to the state. 
Since Protestantism was equated with counterrevolution on the Atlantic Coast, it was 
then easier for the Sandinistas to make the same case in the rest of the country as well.  
In its own way, what the Moravian Church did on the Atlantic Coast is precisely 
what the FDN attempted to do among the northern highlands population. The FDN was 
most successful among the populations that defined themselves by local loyalties 
stemming from a shared way of life different from that of “urban revolutionaries and their 
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‘foreign’ ideology and programs.”93 The FDN positioned itself as a supporter of such 
communities in the same way that the Moravian Church did on the Atlantic Coast. 
However, a key difference that kept Miskito anti-Sandinista sentiment wholly 
separate from that of either the FDN or ARDE was that the Miskitos did not necessarily 
want inclusion in, much less control of, the Nicaraguan state. Unlike the FDN which 
fought for “God and Country” and framed their struggle in a national context, the 
Atlantic Coast contras kept their focus on regional concerns. Maintaining traditional 
culture and land rights were the driving factors behind indigenous contra groups, goals 
that could never be fully supported by either the ARDE or FDN leadership, despite lip 
service paid to the poor treatment of the Atlantic Coast indigenous people by contra 
leaders in other areas of the country.
94
 
Freedom of religion played a key role across contra groups. But instead of 
religion being a means by which to bring more people into the contra community, 
Moravianism was a way in which the Miskitos kept themselves separate from other 
contra forces. What the Miskitos saw as the Sandinista “call to assimilation and 
conformity” was intolerable, be it from Managua or from the FDN.95 When not receiving 
aid directly from the CIA, Indian anti-Sandinista forces would often obtain weapons and 
training through either the FDN or ARDE. Yet even when the FDN, which ostensibly 
shared the same goals as MISURA, sent troops to train Indian comandos in Honduras, 
problems arose. One Miskito comandante recalled, “The boys made trouble only because 
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we did not like the Spaniards [mestizos] being over us.”96 “We are not the soles of the 
FDN’s feet,” another Indian comando remarked.97  
Thus, though the FDN responded to and played up the religious devotion it saw 
on display within its ranks, and religion was an important part of furthering the FDN’s 
overall goals of regime change in Managua, this did not necessarily link them to Atlantic 
Coast contras or counterbalance larger cultural gulfs. The Atlantic Coast was set apart 
from the beginning by its religious and other differences. Their counterrevolution was 
informed by their culture and by mestizo insensitivity to the inherent difference between 
the Atlantic Coast and the rest of the country.
98
  
Among indigenous people on the Atlantic Coast, a sense of a shared history with 
the United States also dovetailed nicely with the American mission of regime change in 
Nicaragua. For the Miskitos, Americans were blameless for any injustices that may have 
occurred during the Somoza years. If anything, so the belief went, Somoza had 
manipulated American companies, for example, into paying Miskito workers substandard 
wages.
99
 And even in the face of past injustices, Miskitos were receptive to American aid 
when the contra war was ramping up. Part of the reason that Miskitos, in particular 
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MISURA, were so receptive while other groups like the ARDE were wary of American 
involvement is due to nostalgia for a time when stores were full of American products, 
and American-owned businesses provided plentiful employment. As Stephen Kinzer 
writes, “they do not deny that those were days of injustice and racial prejudice, days of 
low wages earned in the hot sun or deep in poisonous mine shafts, but still their 
memories are sweet.”100 
Charles Hale found in his study of a Miskito population in Sandy Bay, Nicaragua 
that “when the Reagan administration began to fund MISURASATA, Sandy Bay Miksitu 
interpreted the aid as yet another affirmation of this historic partnership with the 
Americans.”101 The Sandinistas also saw this same phenomenon occurring. Sandinista 
minister of the Nicaraguan Institute for the Atlantic Coast, William Ramírez, claimed at a 
United Nations seminar in Managua in December 1981, “We are currently harassed by 
North American imperialism which utilizes the indigenous problem as an ideological 
weapon to destabilize the revolutionary process.”102 So, unlike the Nicaraguan national 
history that portrayed Americans as looters or hostile invaders that was so prevalent in 
the rest of the country, Miskitos saw a beneficial relationship with the United States in 
their history which, when used in tandem with their distaste for the Sandinista presence 
on the Atlantic Coast, made for a population that was highly receptive to U.S. help in 
fighting the Sandinistas. 
 Atlantic Coast contra leaders weaved the theme of a historical culture of 
resistance into their contemporary struggle. MISURASATA, the Sandinista-sanctioned 
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Atlantic Coast Indian group that was initially led by Brooklyn Rivera and Steadman 
Fagoth before the group broke with the FSLN in 1981, declared “that the period of 
oppression lasting nearly two centuries proves that the indigenous peoples possess an 
inherent revolutionary vocation and a capacity to resist conquest and domination.”103 
MISURASATA did not see the revolution in and of itself as a negative event in 
Nicaraguan history, and they initially sought to occupy a space within the new 
Nicaraguan social order. Miskito contra leader Steadman Fagoth wrote that Miskitos in 
colonial times used their “warrior spirit and their knowledge and ample command of the 
area” to serve as a “bastion of resistance,” and that they “continually rejected the 
invading colonial forces of the era in defense of their territory, their liberty, and their 
political autonomy.”104 Using such modern language and concepts while invoking these 
centuries-old struggles served to fold rebellion and resistance into the social fabric of the 
Atlantic Coast.  
Unlike Steadman Fagoth who eventually threw himself full-force into armed, 
anti-Sandinista resistance, Indian leader Brooklyn Rivera took a diplomatic and arguably 
more pragmatic approach to Sandinista-Atlantic Coast relations. He often worked with 
the Sandinista government to achieve some sort of peace on the Atlantic Coast, which 
earned him a place for a time as the ideological enemy of Fagoth and those who saw his 
actions as capitulatory. However, this could have just been an extension of Rivera’s 
contention that the Contra War was just another case of “‘Spaniards’ fighting among 
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themselves for power,” and that the Atlantic Coast had no real stake in such a fight.105 
“Spaniard” in this context is meant to denote the mestizo population of the western part 
of Nicaragua, a population seen as so foreign to the Indians of the Atlantic Coast that 
they might as well have represented interests oceans away. 
These two ideas, that the Indians of the Atlantic Coast shared a rebellious heritage 
that was forged over hundreds of years of shared history, and that the mestizo majority of 
the country—this is to say, the vast majority of the Sandinistas—was seen as foreign 
made the Atlantic Coast suspect in the eyes of the FSLN. It was especially this lack of a 
sense of belonging to the dominant culture that made the non-mestizo Atlantic Coast 
populations subject to Sandinista mistrust. Just as evangelical Protestants were more 
likely to be suspected of contra sympathies because they found themselves outside the 
dominant culture and with historical ties to powers outside the country, so too did 
Atlantic Coast Indians find themselves, justly or not, under the same suspicions. The 
Atlantic Coast provided a coherent historical narrative in which its legitimacy was rooted 
in a shared culture, geography, and history—a feat the RN could only have wished it 
could weave.
106
 Instead of devising a history that would appeal to many different 
ideologies and backgrounds like the RN had to do, the Atlantic Coast Indians could draw 
from their more singular culture. 
From the Sandinista perspective, “ethnic chauvinism” kept the Atlantic Coast 
outside the Sandinista national project from the beginning of the revolution, but the same 
charge could have been leveled by the FDN and later RN as well as the decade wore 
                                                 
105
 Kinzer, Blood of Brothers, 262. 
106
 Nietschmann, The Unknown War, 52. 
42 
 
on.
107
 While reviled by many Atlantic Coast leaders for going outside the purview of 
acceptable anti-Sandinismo by his willingness to negotiate with Managua as early as 
1984, Brooklyn Rivera was still able to maintain legitimacy with many because he was 
seen as working for the interests of the Atlantic Coast directly and not becoming 
embroiled in the war that many Indians saw as having nothing to do with their interests of 
Atlantic Coast autonomy. He said as much in a speech in which he explained, “Our 
struggle for our Indian rights is our own Indian struggle and not part of the East-West 
political conflict or some other non-Indian conflict.”108 Given Rivera’s independent 
streak and willingness to work with Sandinistas toward the specific goal of Atlantic Coast 
autonomy, the FDN and CIA preferred to work with Steadman Fagoth’s MISURA. 
An excellent study of indigenous history in the service of the contra agenda is 
Steadman Fagoth’s awkwardly-titled 1985 book La Moskitia: Autonomía regional: 
Lamento indígena, ocaso de una raza que se resiste a fallecer (Moskitia: Regional 
Autonomy: Indigenous Lament, Decline of a Race that Refuses to Die). It is part historical 
monograph of the Miskito people, part political screed, with a prologue written by pro-
contra journalist Nicolas Lopez-Maltez which described Fagoth as a “modern Miskut,” 
the mythical progenitor of Miskito people.
109
 But this sort of self-serving, historical 
allegory was not a simple case of contemporary hagiography. The Nicaraguan state had a 
history of depriving the Miskitos of their leadership, and Miskito contra comandante 
Reynaldo Reyes describes his people as being without a leader for “a hundred years.”110 
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This sort of claim could help explain why Fagoth’s detractors could make the case that 
he, as scholar Philippe Bourgois posits, “succeeded in distorting these nationalist 
aspirations in order to provoke confrontation with the new Nicaraguan government.”111 
By making himself an authority on Miskito history, Fagoth could then position himself to 
manipulate it to serve his own ends which, as his close association with the FDN and the 
United States would prove, lined up solidly against the Sandinista regime.  
La Moskitia is most interesting in terms of how Fagoth framed Indian 
independence. In his Platform for Regional Autonomy, Fagoth sets about justifying the 
Atlantic Coast contra movement by relying heavily on history. He first details certain 
“inalienable rights” that the people of the Atlantic Coast should enjoy, including land, 
culture, and liberty. The language here reflects heavily the precedents concerning 
individual rights set forth in the U.S. Declaration of Independence that held such import 
to this pro-American community. Native language was to be preserved along with native 
laws. Fagoth claimed that Indians were “dying slowly” because of state institutions that 
were created without the participation of Indians and were thus in conflict with traditional 
laws. The Indian political structure he described relied heavily on the historic communal 
assemblies which formed the backbone of “Indigenous Democracy.”112 So if the Indians 
were to reclaim what Fagoth viewed as their natural democratic heritage, then they 
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needed to join the ranks of the contras who also sought to bring new elections to the rest 
of Nicaragua. 
 This is not to say that Fagoth was entirely opposed to certain state interventions. 
In fact, he suggested that the central government could participate in the planning, 
financing, and technical assistance in support of development of the Atlantic Coast. 
However, Indian involvement was an absolute necessity, he argued, to create the proper 
context for the new region. This “context” was precisely what Fagoth was trying to create 
with his book and the invocation of Miskito history to give his words the force of 
tradition. MISURASATA had already declared years earlier that “indigenous populations 
are able to act from a political consciousness that stems from an ethnic consciousness.”113 
A key component of this consciousness was knowledge of a shared history, something 
Steadman Fagoth used adeptly to justify and give context to his war. That Fagoth was 
able to publish a document that would seem completely alien to FDN fighters in 
Honduras or Edén Pastora’s ex-Sandinistas in the South, yet still talk about the “struggle 
to liberate the Nicaraguan people” shows the extent to which Atlantic Coast interests 
muddled the grand contra narrative.
114
 
 There were exchanges between anti-Sandinista forces and Atlantic Coast 
populations as early as 1980, including training, but there was a great ambivalence on the 
part of many residents of the Atlantic Coast toward the FDN and later the RN.
115
 The 
culture and history that drew so many indigenous fighters to MISURASATA and 
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MISURA also kept them at a distance from comandos and leaders from other contra 
groups. Even indigenous military leaders became disillusioned with the RN leadership 
and their CIA backers due to inconsideration of the specific goals and desires of Atlantic 
Coast contras: 
Men from the CIA would come to talk to us about the dangers of Sandinista 
expansionism and the threat to the interests of the United States. They never 
spoke to us about the rights of Nicaraguan Indians or of any Central American 
Indians. There was apparently no plan for the future government of the Atlantic 
Coast if we should win. We did not matter to them. We were just meat to them, 
nothing more.”116  
 One cultural geographer posited that the nationalist aspirations of the Atlantic 
Coast leaders actually “threatened the establishment of a united front against the 
Sandinistas.”117 The FSLN eventually understood this as well, given that the demands of 
the Atlantic contras were “not for power in Managua or most of the country, but simply 
to be left alone on the coast, and thus a concession or seeming concession was less of a 
challenge to FSLN power.”118 The very cultural and historical factors that brought the 
Atlantic Coast peoples into the contra war were ultimately what caused them to 
disengage as well. 
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ARDE 
 
   
 
The Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática (ARDE) enjoyed international attention 
that far outweighed its effectiveness as a military organization. Never a major military 
threat to the FSLN, the ARDE relied on its charismatic leader, Edén Pastora, to secure 
U.S. funding and push its message out into the world. And that message was distinct from 
that of the other contra organizations. Operating in the swampy southern region of 
Nicaragua, the ARDE was not motivated by land rights, as their ranks were largely 
comprised of ex-Sandinistas from urban centers operating outside of their geographic 
comfort zone. Neither did the ARDE’s discourse emphasize personal liberties, ethnic 
affiliations, or even an outright rejection of Sandinista policies. In fact, Pastora had been 
the Sandinista government’s Vice Minister of Interior and then Vice Minister of Defense 
until resigning in 1981. The ARDE’s main political aim was to recover what they viewed 
as a betrayed revolutionary moment. Understanding the ARDE’s motivations and how 
they were in many ways inextricable from Pastora’s own personal history and grievances 
helps explain the difficulty the contra groups had in becoming part of an effective 
alliance.  
In April 1982, Pastora publicly announced his opposition to the FSLN, and by the 
same time the following year he had actively taken up arms against the Sandinista 
regime. Yet in one of his early press conferences, he made it clear that ARDE had no 
intention of joining forces with the FDN due to their Guardia leadership. The CIA, 
47 
 
realizing that Pastora’s image as a “social democrat” could help to ameliorate the 
negative image of the former Guardia beginning to populate the Nicaraguan-Honduran 
border, met with Pastora in February 1982 in the hopes of bringing him into the 
blossoming contra movement.
119
 In addition to leading a fighting force, CIA officers 
hoped Pastora would also tour Europe to win over FSLN supporters there and sway 
popular opinion to the contra cause.
120
 The ARDE was to be a counterbalance to the 
difficult reminder of the Somoza era that the FDN represented for many. They made the 
same calls for democracy, freedom of worship, and freedom of the press as the FDN, and 
even took a stance against the presence of Cuban advisors in Nicaragua.
121
 However, the 
ARDE was to follow its own (and Pastora’s) distinct aspirations. 
At the same time that Brooklyn Rivera professed the Atlantic Coast contra 
movement to be independent of “the East-West political conflict,” Pastora declared that 
“our sandinismo cannot permit that we be caught up in the East-West conflict, since that 
is contrary to the national interests.”122 Despite the FSNL’s appropriation of Augusto 
Sandino’s name and image, the ARDE’s invocation of early-20th century Nicaraguan 
revolutionary leader was not incompatible with anti-Sandinista aspirations. Sandino was, 
and continues to be, a popular inspiration for Nicaraguans of all political stripes, 
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including contra comandos during the 1980s.
123
 Pastora in particular felt a strong affinity 
for Sandino.
124
 For Pastora, as he explained to Fidel Castro in one of his many visits to 
Cuba, Sandino represented “nationalism, sovereignty, and shame.”125 The first two points 
are evident given Sandino’s guerrilla campaign against U.S. Marines who occupied 
Nicaragua from 1912 to 1933. One ARDE member explained, “Nicaraguans follow the 
example of Sandino, because he fought for national independence.”126 The ARDE itself 
claimed inspiration from “the nationalist ideals of Augusto C. Sandino and Pedro Joaquín 
Chamorro.”127 Chamorro was the murdered anti-Somoza journalist and newspaper owner 
whose assassination was part of a series of events that helped propel the Sandinistas to 
power, and thus, the symbolic meaning of both these men would not have been lost on 
Nicaraguans and was a way to present revolutionary credentials in shorthand form.  
 The last element of Pastora’s comment, however, is more complex. This “shame” 
was initially framed as the continued violation of Nicaragua’s sovereignty. In an early 
essay, he called on “all Nicaraguans to put themselves on a war footing as long as there is 
a foreign solider on the native soil.”128 But the shame evolved into something different 
for Pastora. As Comandante Cero, Pastora’s notoriety was a boon for the early Sandinsta 
regime. He was the Sandinista’s own personal Che Guevara: a photogenic, romantic 
guerrilla who stormed the National Palace in Managua on August 25, 1978 with a cadre 
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of urban guerrillas and was famously photographed afterwards wearing a revolutionary’s 
beret with grenades dangling from his bandoliers. However, as the realities of running a 
revolutionary government set in, he was shunted aside and eventually became 
disillusioned with the direction of the FSLN. He resigned from his government positions 
in July 1981 and formally broke all ties with Managua on April 15, 1982. Pastora’s 
shame no longer came from a collective, Nicaraguan memory of foreign intervention in 
its domestic affairs, but rather his role as a formative part of a revolution that he was no 
longer a part of.  
 Thus, the ARDE was founded on September 24, 1982 as a means for disaffected 
Sandinistas and others who wanted nothing to do with ex-Guardia to voice their 
grievances with the FSLN.
129
 Alfonso Robelo was one such disillusioned revolutionary 
who shared many of Pastora’s views. Robelo was at first a “leading anti-Somoza political 
figure” of the late-1970s.130 Initially a member of the post-Somoza five-member 
governing junta, Robelo too became disillusioned with the FSLN, and eventually joined 
the ARDE. He explained on U.S. television in 1984 that “We’re fighting for the 
democratic rescue of the Nicaraguan revolution. We are revolutionaries. We do not 
accept the name Contras. We are not counterrevolutionaries. We are part of the 
revolution that has been betrayed.”131 Robelo and the ARDE in general did not view 
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themselves as being contra—“against” in Spanish—the principles of the Nicaraguan 
revolution. Indeed, some in Washington saw Pastora as having an “authoritarian streak” 
not completely out of line with a former Sandinista of his stature.
132
 In a 1987 speech at 
Ashland University, Robelo even lamented the “absence of books by socialist writers 
who follow a line other than that of Moscow” in Nicaragua, not exactly a talking point 
from the Reagan White House.
133
 However, there was a space within the contras for a 
more traditionally leftist voice, and Robelo would later join the RN-precursor Unified 
Nicaraguan Opposition (Unidad Nicaragüense Opositora—UNO) triumvirate before 
joining the directorate of the RN in 1987. 
The idea that the Sandinistas had betrayed the revolution was not unique to the 
ARDE; it was also reflected in the discourse of the broader contra movement. Edgar 
Chamorro made a similar argument during his time as public relations chief for the FDN 
by framing the Contra War as “an effort to rescue the revolution.”134 One document 
attributed to the RN, although predating the official formation of that group by two years, 
stated, “the Nicaraguan people reject, obviously, the imposition of a regime that in 
essence contradicts the values and aspirations that the revolutionary process 
originated.”135 Robelo made the same point when he argued that the Sandinistas violated 
their commitment to the revolution by substituting a “totalitarian project” for a 
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“democratic” one.136 Thus, the value of the original intent of the revolution tended not to 
be contested by the contras; most could agree the Somoza dictatorship was bad for 
Nicaragua and that there was a need to move away from dictatorship. The revolution 
opened up the country to the possibility of a democratic process, the contras would argue, 
and was a clear break with a past that was politically pathological. By accepting the 
revolution, then, the contras sought to place the course of Nicaraguan history on their 
side. The revolution happened and there was nothing that could put the revolutionary 
ideals back in the bottle. Ignoring the revolution completely, or worse yet, wanting to 
turn back the hands on the clock was the sort of regressive attitude the ARDE and FDN 
both wanted to distance themselves from. What the contra groups could do was try to 
wrest away the legitimacy the revolution gave the Sandinistas, and reclaim symbols that 
the contras could then appropriate as their own. The ARDE found more success taking 
this tact than other contra forces because of their members’ previous experiences within 
the Sandinista fold fighting against the Somoza dictatorship. 
While the FDN regularly received negative publicity over its Guardia 
composition, the ARDE was lauded for its ex-Sandinista credentials. An early ARDE 
communiqué closed with the refrain, “Without totalitarianism or a return to the past (sin 
totalitarismo ni regreso al pasado).”137 This presented the ARDE’s dissatisfaction with 
the Sandinista regime, while providing a not-so-subtle dig at the potential for a return to 
dictatorship presented by the FDN. Just as the CIA wanted, Pastora spoke extensively to 
European and North American journalists and even traveled to U.S. college campuses. 
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What one author terms Pastora’s “pose as the true revolutionary” shed a positive light on 
the contras by playing up revolutionary bona fides over more problematic ties to the 
Somoza years.
138
  
But ultimately Pastora’s independent streak and unwillingness to consult with the 
U.S. government on military matters (while readily accepting U.S. financial and military 
aid) strained the ARDE’s ability to effectively oppose the FSLN: “The democratic world, 
the timid world, does not want to give us rifles. They do not want to give us rifles 
because we are nationalists.”139 In reality, the ARDE was the exact kind of contra group 
that moderates in North America and Europe might have been willing to support. The 
CIA envisioned a two-front war involving a force in the south, but the fact that Pastora 
was judged to be too much of an unpredictable rogue was part of the reason they were not 
funded on the same level as the FDN.
140
  
Another factor was the ARDE’s poor military leadership. Even FSLN observers 
noted that "[f]orces in the south" were not as integrated as the FDN, "which was more 
unified." The FSLN had their own fraught history in dealing with Pastora, ending with 
his open opposition to the FSLN in 1982, and they doubted the United States would have 
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any better luck trying to control him.
141
 The CIA readily recognized Pastora’s 
propaganda value, but the assessment that Pastora’s military victories were more “flash-
in-the-pan outings” than “solid progress” began soon after he began his military 
campaign. For example, his lack of judgement was on particular display on September 9, 
1983 when he ordered two cessnas to bomb the Managua airport hours before U.S. 
senators Gary Hart and William S. Cohen arrived at the same airport on a congressional 
fact-finding mission.
142
 Pastora’s “iron control over military matters” in the face of a 
sputtering insurgency tested the patience of his dwindling supporters in Washington.
143
 
When various U.S. government agencies began to angle for a more unified contra 
movement in 1984 to balance the relative strengths and weaknesses of the disparate 
groups, in particular the FDN and the ARDE, Pastora defiantly declared in an interview 
on Costa Rican television that “the CIA will have to kill me first” before joining with the 
FDN.
144
 Pastora’s prophecy ultimately did not come to fruition: no one would kill 
Comandante Cero, but neither would he see the end of the war as a combatant.  
Pastora began 1984 by ordering a military stand down in an attempt to force the 
United States to designate him overall commander of contra forces.
145
 Wounds sustained 
in an assassination attempt in May led ARDE leadership to replace him as military chief. 
By the time the U.S. Congress let contra funding run out in October of that year, he 
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lamented that “we are fighting alone, immensely alone.”146 By 1986, Pastora had 
formally left the ARDE and had started a shark fishing business in Costa Rica. He had 
alienated both CIA and more-sympathetic State Department officials, had never 
integrated the ARDE into the larger contra effort, and had trivial military gains to show 
for the U.S. support he received. Pastora was not alone in charting the ARDE’s course 
toward isolation and irrelevance. The group’s political directorate advocated for Somoza 
supporters who committed crimes to be handed over to any new Nicaraguan 
government—an obvious attempt to antagonize former Guardia and prevent any 
possibility of unification between the ARDE and the FDN.
147
  
With Pastora’s removal in 1986, the ARDE’s political outlook did find somewhat 
greater influence within the larger contra movement. Despite “deep suspicions” on both 
sides, the northern, southern, and Atlantic Coast fronts began to coordinate to a greater 
extent following Pastora’s departure from the contra movement.148 This explains how 
UNO, the FDN-aligned anti-FSLN coalition begun in 1985, was able to talk about “the 
consistent and permanent projection of the essentially nationalist character of our 
struggle” without seeming disingenuous.149 The ARDE’s Alfonso Robelo was a more 
convincing spokesman than anyone the FDN could have put forward to make the pitch 
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that the contras deserved “the full support of the liberals in the United States.”150 The 
ARDE leaders also participated in and influenced the RN when it was formed out of 
UNO and the Southern Opposition Bloc (BOS), a southern anti-Sandinista political 
organization, in 1987. FDN military chief Enrique Bermudez, himself a former member 
of Somoza’s Guardia, stated, “I have learned to live with many individuals who have 
differing viewpoints on many issues. We share a common objective though—the 
liberation of our homeland from a totalitarian government and foreign powers.”151 The 
FDN and the ARDE became two parts of a more effective whole after overcoming the 
divisions attributable primarily to conflicting personalities. However, by the time they 
came together in a meaningful way, the contra movement was in decline as U.S. funds 
and political support diminished in the twilight of the Reagan administration. Ironically, 
the Bush years would see the ultimate dissolution of the contras, as well as their final 
triumph. 
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CONCLUSION 
   
 
 Unity among the contras was elusive for most of their existence. From the onset 
of the Contra War there was an internal struggle between the FDN, the ARDE, and the 
Atlantic Coast forces over the contras’ “essential values and beliefs and content of their 
collective identity.”152 Each group developed its own goals and vision around a 
generalized anti-Sandinista mission, even as they made a “self-conscious and strategic 
effort” to assimilate those disparate visions into a unified whole.153 This did not happen 
effectively until May 1987 when BOS, UNO, the FDN, and the remnants of the ARDE’s 
military force coalesced into the RN. The main factors precipitating this final drive for 
unification was the Atlantic Coast disengaging from the contra effort, the exit of Edén 
Pastora from any meaningful leadership position, and the cessation of U.S. military aid to 
the contras. 
 In 1982, MISURASATA leader Brooklyn Rivera stated that the Atlantic Coast 
contras’ “principal objective is a negotiated agreement between the Indians of Nicaragua 
and the government of Nicaragua” that guaranteed property rights and autonomy.154 This 
was a far cry from the absolutist mindset of the other contra groups for whom regime 
change in Managua was the only acceptable outcome of the Contra War. Contrastingly, 
the indigenous people who made up the ranks of the Atlantic Coast contras had always 
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maintained “clear-cut territorial objectives” that never gelled with the rhetoric of either 
the FDN or the ARDE.
155
 MISURA and MISURASATA were ultimately not fighting for 
all of Nicaragua as the FDN and the ARDE claimed to be doing. Instead the Atlantic 
Coast peoples were motivated by “self-determination over [their] own territory and 
resource base.”156 In his analysis of the Contra War, economist and member of the 
ARDE’s political directorate Donald Castillo Rivas admitted that neither the FDN’s nor 
the ARDE’s leadership fully understood the Atlantic Coast’s concerns and motivations, 
instead viewing the Atlantic Coast as a “semi-colony” through the same paternalistic lens 
with which the FSLN initially viewed the Atlantic Coast.
157
 These regional goals that led 
the Atlantic Coast Indians to first reject Sandinismo ultimately kept them from fully 
integrating into the rest of the contras. 
  Upon realizing that the Atlantic Coast contras’ goals did not extend much beyond 
the region, the Sandinista government entered into negotiations with representatives from 
MISURA and MISURASATA, in addition to other indigenous and creole communities 
on the Atlantic Coast.
158
 These negotiations culminated in the guarantee of Atlantic Coast 
autonomy through a series of laws, and ultimately in the 1987 Nicaraguan constitution. 
Despite sporadic fighting that continued into the following year, FDN military chief 
Enrique Bermúdez lamented that the Sandinistas had the “Atlantic front almost 
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completely under their control” by 1988, as a result of autonomy guarantees.159 
MISURA’s and MISURASATA’s preoccupation with autonomy was never integrated 
into the contra platform beyond lip service given to Indian rights in general. However, 
losing this front also meant the contras shed a major obstacle to unity. The RN no longer 
had to bring a region it never fully understood into the contra project, and could instead 
focus on uniting the northern and southern fronts. 
 Aside from the Atlantic Coast, Edén Pastora was perhaps the second biggest 
obstacle to unifying the contras. Members of the ARDE had begun to cooperate with the 
FDN politically, if not yet militarily in 1985. In June of that year, Alfonso Robelo joined 
UNO, lending the FDN-aligned group a more left-leaning voice, and a month later 
former-Sandinista Central Bank president Alfredo Cesar started BOS with an eye to 
"substitute military pressure and war with political negotiation."
160
 Both men would 
eventually join the RN leadership. Despite the fact that ARDE and non-FDN-aligned 
leaders were willing to make compromises, real headway was only made after Pastora 
was no longer in a position of influence within the contras beginning in late 1984. 
Contrast the ARDE’s initial position calling for agents of Somoza’s dictatorship to be 
punished (i.e. former members of the National Guard), with the later proposal for 
amnesty as an “essential condition” for the RN’s military demobilization.161 Conversely, 
FDN-aligned elements softened to the more nuanced position on the revolution that the 
ARDE espoused, while all agreed on the uncontroversial baseline calls for individual 
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freedoms and new elections that the FDN had articulated since its inception. Both the 
FDN’s and the ARDE’s military were brought under the same umbrella as the Army of 
the Resistance North and South respectively. It is difficult to imagine this scenario with a 
figure as uncompromising and antagonistic as Pastora still influencing the ARDE’s 
military direction and political agenda. 
Finally, with U.S. support in decline and no promise of renewed military aid on 
the horizon, there was an added urgency to contra unity. 1986 was the last time the 
contras received overt U.S. military aid, with Congress approving a $100 million aid 
package after a two-year funding ban.
162
 However, a little over a month after the funding 
was approved, the inner-workings of the illegal sale of arms to Iran to fund the contras 
were exposed. Investigations into what came to be known as the Iran-Contra scandal 
continued until late 1987. Amid the scandal and the reticence of a new U.S. presidential 
administration to continue aggressively pursuing clandestine wars abroad, Congress 
easily voted down another $36 million in lethal aid in 1988. Differences and 
disagreements among the contras had been ignored in the past so long as there was plenty 
of cash and training to keep everyone fighting. It used to be enough to simply “give the 
image of unity,” as one UNO document put it, to build bipartisan support for the contras 
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in the United States.
163
 But as the funding dried up, the only way the contras could 
survive was through actual cooperation. 
Outright military victory was always a long shot for the contras, if the possibility 
ever existed at all. Not only did they have to deal with the sophistication and might of an 
increasingly well-equipped and expanding Sandinista army, but they had the added stress 
of fickle funding linked to a shifting and sometimes contradictory U.S. foreign policy. 
Without funds to maintain the contras’ pressure on Managua, as Assistant Secretary of 
State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Langhorne Motley argued, “Why should the 
Sandinistas negotiate with them?”164 By 1987, even the CIA conceded that a “stronger 
and more viable insurgency” might not be able to force the FSLN into accepting 
“diplomatic initiatives.”165 However, by simply surviving, offering resistance whenever 
possible and denying the FSLN an outright military victory, the thought was the contras 
could play a role in forcing democratic elections.
166
 Perhaps ARDE military leader and 
eventual Conservative Party politician Fernando Chamorro best articulated the contras’ 
ultimate goal when he said, “The contras should be maintained as a sword of Damocles 
hanging over the Sandinistas. But today, I believe that civilian politics should be our 
main battleground.”167 
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 In 1990, after 10 years and upwards of 30,000 deaths between contras, 
Sandinistas, and civilians, the Contra War came to an end with what most international 
observers agreed were free and fair elections resulting in the defeat of the FSLN at the 
ballot box.
168
 The only U.S. money flowing was marked for “democracy promotion,” and 
even then it was a paltry $9 million compared to the soaring aid at the height of the 
Contra War.
169
 Contra troops never marched into Managua, or held any of the country’s 
most populous cities. Sandinista President Daniel Ortega even said, “It isn’t the contras 
that are going to defeat us, but our own collapsing economy.”170 However, since the 
contras did not succumb to factionalism and collapse after U.S. funding dried up, instead 
finding a unified political and military force in the form of the RN, they were able to play 
a role in pressuring Managua to assure elections.
171
 While some individual contras would 
become politicians, none of the contra groups formed into political parties and none 
participated directly in Violeta Chamorro’s successful 1990 presidential campaign. For 
its part, the FDN explicitly declared from the outset that it did not “deign to make itself 
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into a political party by way of being a military or ideological vanguard.”172 The Atlantic 
Coast contras’ regional focus made the same true for them as well. While Edén Pastora 
would eventually return to Nicaraguan political life, the ARDE did not serve as his 
springboard to power. 
 U.S. funds had aided the contras in becoming a military force, but it was the 
coalescing of the disparate contra groups into a unified Nicaraguan resistance that 
partially proved an early FDN premonition: “none of the Nicaragua groups in exile can 
by itself overthrow [the FSLN].”173 None of the contra groups managed to defeat the 
Sandinistas militarily, but they did survive long enough to see a democratic transition of 
power which rendered their continued existence unnecessary. The contras demobilized in 
the summer of 1990, in a final act of unity that had long eluded them. 
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